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Abstract
We address the problem of general function release under dif-
ferential privacy, by developing a functional mechanism that
applies under the weak assumptions of oracle access to target
function evaluation and sensitivity. These conditions permit
treatment of functions described explicitly or implicitly as
algorithmic black boxes. We achieve this result by leveraging
the iterated Bernstein operator for polynomial approximation
of the target function, and polynomial coefficient perturbation.
Under weak regularity conditions, we establish fast rates on
utility measured by high-probability uniform approximation.
We provide a lower bound on the utility achievable for any
functional mechanism that is ε-differentially private. The gen-
erality of our mechanism is demonstrated by the analysis of
a number of example learners, including naive Bayes, non-
parametric estimators and regularized empirical risk minimiza-
tion. Competitive rates are demonstrated for kernel density
estimation; and ε-differential privacy is achieved for a broader
class of support vector machines than known previously.
1 Introduction
In recent years, differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006) has
emerged as a leading paradigm for privacy-preserving statis-
tical analyses. It provides formal guarantees that aggregate
statistics output by a randomized mechanism are not signifi-
cantly influenced by the presence or absence of an individual
datum. Where the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al. 2006) is
a de facto approach for converting vector-valued functions to
differential privacy, in this paper we seek an equivalent ap-
proach for privatizing function-valued mappings. We achieve
our goal through the development of a novel Bernstein func-
tional mechanism. Unlike existing mechanisms, ours applies
to releasing explicitly and implicitly defined functions, and
is characterized by a full theoretical analysis.
Our setting is the release of functions that depend on
privacy-sensitive training data, and that can be subsequently
evaluated on arbitrary test points. This non-interactive setting
matches a wide variety of learning tasks from naive Bayes
classification, non-parametric methods (kernel density esti-
mation and regression) where the function of train and test
data is explicit, to generalized linear models, support vec-
tor machines where the function is only implicitly defined
by an iterative algorithm. Our generic mechanism is based
on functional approximation by Bernstein basis polynomials,
specifically via an iterated Bernstein operator. Privacy is guar-
anteed by sanitizing the coefficients of approximation, which
requires only function evaluation. It is the very limited oracle
access required by our mechanism—to non-private function
evaluation and sensitivity—that grants it broad applicability
akin to the Laplace mechanism.
The Bernstein polynomials central to our mechanism are
used in the Stone-Weierstrass theorem to uniformly approxi-
mate any continuous function on a closed interval. Moreover,
the Bernstein operator offers several advantages such as data-
independent bounds, no requirement of access to target func-
tion derivatives, and yields approximations that are pointwise
convex combinations of the function evaluations on a cover.
As a result, applying privacy-preserving perturbations to the
approximation’s coefficients permits us to control utility and
achieve fast convergence rates.
In addition to being analyzed in full, the Bernstein mech-
anism is easy to use. We demonstrate this with a variety of
example analyses of the mechanism applied to learners. Fi-
nally, we provide a lower bound that fundamentally limits
utility under private function release, partly resolving a ques-
tion posed by Hall, Rinaldo, and Wasserman (2013). This
matches (up to logarithmic factors) our upper bound in the
linear case.
Related Work. Polynomial approximation has proven use-
ful in differential privacy outside function release (Thaler,
Ullman, and Vadhan 2012; Chandrasekaran et al. 2014). Few
previous attempts have been made towards private function
release. Hall, Rinaldo, and Wasserman (2013) add Gaussian
process noise which only yields a weaker form of privacy,
namely (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and does not admit general
utility rates. Zhang et al. (2012) introduce a functional mech-
anism for the more specific task of perturbing the objective
in private optimization, but they assume separability in the
training data and do not obtain rates on utility.
Wang et al. (2013) propose a mechanism that releases a
summary of data in a trigonometric basis, able to respond to
queries that are smooth as in our setting, but are also required
to be separable in the training dataset as assumed by Zhang et
al. (2012). A natural application is kernel density estimation,
which would achieve a rate of O (log(1/β)/(nε))h/(`+h) as
does our approach. Private KDE has also been explored in var-
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ious other settings (Duchi, Wainwright, and Jordan 2013) and
under weaker notions of utility (Hall, Rinaldo, and Wasser-
man 2013). Zhang, Rubinstein, and Dimitrakakis (2016) ex-
plore discrete naive Bayes under differential privacy, while
we investigate parametric Gaussian and non-parametric KDE
for class-conditional likelihoods.
As an example of an implicitly defined function, we con-
sider regularized empirical risk minimization such as lo-
gistic regression, ridge regression, and the SVM. Previous
mechanisms for private SVM release and ERM more gener-
ally (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2008; Rubinstein et al. 2012;
Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and Sarwate 2011; Jain and Thakurta
2014; 2013; Bassily, Smith, and Thakurta 2014) require finite-
dimensional feature mapping or translation-invariant kernels.
Hall, Rinaldo, and Wasserman (2013) consider more general
mappings but provide (ε, δ)-differential privacy. Our treat-
ment of regularized ERM extends to kernels that may be
translation-variant with infinite-dimensional mappings, while
providing stronger privacy guarantees.
2 Preliminaries
Notation and Problem Setting. Throughout the paper,
vectors are written in bold and the i-th component of a vector
x is denoted by xi. We consider X an arbitrary (possibly
infinite) domain and D ∈ Xn a database of n points in
X . We refer to n as the size of the database D. For a pos-
itive integer `, let Y = [0, 1]` be a set of query points and
F : Xn × Y → R the target function. Once the database D
is fixed, we denote by FD = F (D, ·) the function parame-
terized by D that we aim to release. For example: D might
represent a training set—over X a product space of feature
vectors and labels—with Y representing test points from the
same feature space; FD would then be a classifier resulting
from training on D. Section 6 presents examples for F . In
Section 3, we show how to privately release the function FD
and we provide alternative error bounds depending on the
regularity of F .
Definition 1. Let h be a positive integer and T > 0. A
function f : [0, 1]` → R is (h, T )-smooth if it is Ch([0, 1]`)
and its partial derivatives up to order h are all bounded by T .
Definition 2. Let 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and L > 0. A function
f : [0, 1]` → R is (γ, L)-Ho¨lder continuous if, for every
x,y ∈ [0, 1]`, |f(x) − f(y)| ≤ L‖x − y‖γ∞. When γ = 1,
we refer to f as L-Lipschitz.
Our goal is to develop a private release mechanism for the
function FD in the non-interactive setting. A non-interactive
mechanism takes a function F and a database D as inputs
and outputs a synopsis A which can be used to evaluate the
function FD on Y without accessing the database D further.
Differential Privacy. To provide strong privacy guarantees
on the release of FD, we adopt the well-established notion of
differential privacy.
Definition 3 (Dwork et al. 2006). LetR be a (possibly infi-
nite) set of responses. A mechanismM : X ? → R (meaning
that, for every D ∈ X ? = ⋃n>0 Xn,M(D) is anR-valued
random variable) is said to provide (ε, δ)-differential privacy
for ε > 0 and 0 ≤ δ < 1 if, for every n ∈ N, for every pair
(D,D′) ∈ Xn ×Xn of databases differing in one entry only
(henceforth denoted by D ∼ D′), and for every measurable
S ⊆ R, we have P[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεP[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ. If
δ = 0 we simply say thatM provides ε-differential privacy.
By limiting the influence of data on the induced response
distribution, a powerful adversary (with knowledge of all but
one input datum, the mechanism up to random source, and
unbounded computation) cannot effectively identify an un-
known input datum from mechanism responses. The Laplace
mechanism (Dwork et al. 2006) is a generic tool for differ-
ential privacy: adding zero-mean Laplace noise1 to a vector-
valued function provides privacy if the noise is calibrated to
the function’s sensitivity.
Definition 4 (Dwork et al. 2006). The sensitivity of a func-
tion f : Xn → Rd is given by S(f) = supD∼D′ ‖f(D) −
f(D′)‖1, where the supremum is taken over all D,D′ ∈ Xn
that differ in one entry only. The sensitivity of a function
F : Xn×Y → Rd is defined as S(F ) = supy∈Y S(F (·,y)).
Lemma 1 (Dwork et al. 2006). Let f : Xn → Rd be
a non-private function of finite sensitivity, and let Z ∼
Lap(S(f)/ε)d. Then, the random function f˜(D) = f(D) +
Z provides ε-differential privacy.
Given a mechanism, we measure its accuracy as follows.
Definition 5. Let F : Xn × Y → R. A mechanism M is
(α, β)-accurate with respect to FD if for any database D ∈
Xn andA =M(D), with probability at least 1− β over the
randomness ofM, supy∈Y |A(y)− FD(y)| ≤ α.
3 The Bernstein Mechanism
Algorithm 1 introduces a differentially-private mechanism for
releasing FD : Y → R, a family of (h, T )-smooth or (γ, L)-
Ho¨lder continuous functions, parameterized by D ∈ Xn.
Algorithm 1 The Bernstein mechanism
Sanitization – Inputs: private dataset D ∈ Xn; sensitiv-
ity S(F ) and oracle access to target F : Xn × Y → R
Parameters: cover size k, Bernstein order h positive
integers; privacy budget ε > 0
1: P ← ({0, 1/k, 2/k, . . . , 1})` . Lattice cover of Y
2: λ← S(F )(k + 1)`/ε . Perturbation scale
3: For each p = (p1, . . . , p`) ∈ P :
4: F˜D(p)← FD(p) + Z, where Z i.i.d.∼ Lap(λ)
5: Return:
{
F˜D(p) | p ∈ P
}
Evaluation – Inputs: query y ∈ Y; private response{
F˜D(p) | p ∈ P
}
6: b(h)νi,k ← Compute basis . See Definition 8
7: Return:
∑`
j=1
∑k
νj=0
F˜D
(
ν1
k , · · · , ν`k
)∏`
i=1 b
(h)
νi,k
(yi)
1A Lap(λ)-distributed real random variable Z has probability
density proportional to exp(−|y|/λ).
The mechanism makes use of the iterated Bernstein poly-
nomial of FD, which we introduce next (for a comprehensive
survey refer to Lorentz 1953, Micchelli 1973). This approxi-
mation consists of a linear combination of so-called Bernstein
basis polynomials, whose coefficients are evaluations of tar-
get FD on a (lattice) cover P .
We briefly introduce the univariate Bernstein basis polyno-
mials and state some of their properties.
Definition 6. Let k be a positive integer. The Bernstein basis
polynomials of degree k are defined as bν,k(y) =
(
k
ν
)
yν(1−
y)k−ν for ν = 0, . . . , k.
Proposition 2 (Lorentz 1953). For every y ∈ [0, 1], any
positive integer k and 0 ≤ ν ≤ k, we have bν,k(y) ≥ 0 and∑k
ν=0 bν,k(y) = 1.
In order to introduce the iterated Bernstein polynomials,
we first need to recall the Bernstein operator.
Definition 7. Let f : [0, 1]→ R and k be a positive integer.
The Bernstein polynomial of f of degree k is defined as
Bk(f ; y) =
∑k
ν=0 f (ν/k) bν,k(y).
The Bernstein operator Bk maps a function f , defined
on [0, 1], to Bkf , where the function Bkf evaluated at y is
Bk(f ; y). Note that the Bernstein operator is linear and if
f(y) ∈ [a1, a2] for every y ∈ [0, 1], then from Proposition 2
it follows that Bk(f ; y) ∈ [a1, a2] for every positive integer
k and y ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, it is not hard to show that any
linear function is a fixed point for Bk. For completeness, we
provide a short proof in Appendix A.
Definition 8 (Micchelli 1973). Let h be a positive integer.
The iterated Bernstein operator of order h is defined as the
sequence of linear operators B(h)k = I − (I − Bk)h =∑h
i=1
(
h
i
)
(−1)i−1Bik, where I = B0k denotes the identity
operator and Bik is defined inductively as B
i
k = Bk ◦Bi−1k
for i ≥ 1. The iterated Bernstein polynomial of order h can
then be computed as:
B
(h)
k (f ; y) =
k∑
ν=0
f
(ν
k
)
b
(h)
ν,k(y) ,
where b(h)ν,k(y) =
∑h
i=1
(
h
i
)
(−1)i−1Bi−1k (bν,k; y) .
We observe that B(1)k = Bk. Although the bases b
(h)
ν,k are
not always positive for h ≥ 2, we still have∑kν=0 b(h)ν,k(y) =
1 for every y ∈ [0, 1]. The iterated Bernstein polynomial of a
multivariate function f : [0, 1]` → R is analogously defined.
Definition 9. Assume f : [0, 1]` → R and let k1, . . . , k`, h
be positive integers. The (multivariate) iterated Bernstein
polynomial of f (of order h) is defined as
B
(h)
k1,...,k`
(f ;y) =
∑`
j=1
kj∑
νj=0
f
(
ν1
k1
, · · · , ν`
k`
)∏`
i=1
b
(h)
νi,ki
(yi).
For ease of exposition, we fix user-selected k ∈ N such
that k1 = . . . = k` = k. The Bernstein mechanism perturbs
the evaluation of FD on a lattice cover P of Y = [0, 1]`
parameterized by k.
4 Analysis of Mechanism Privacy and Utility
In the following result, we assume ` to be an arbitrary but
fixed constant with Y = [0, 1]`. We underline that this is
a common assumption in the differential privacy literature,
especially when dealing with Euclidean spaces (Blum, Ligett,
and Roth 2008; Dwork and Lei 2009; Wasserman and Zhou
2010; Lei 2011; Wang et al. 2013).
Theorem 3 (Main Theorem). Let `, h ∈ N+, 0 < γ ≤ 1,
L > 0 and T > 0 be constants. Let X be an arbitrary
space and Y = [0, 1]`. Let furthermore F : Xn × Y → R
with S(F ) = o(1). For ε > 0, the Bernstein mechanismM
provides ε-differential privacy. Moreover, for 0 < β < 1
the mechanismM is (α, β)-accurate with error scaling as
follows, where hidden constants depend on `, L, γ, T, h.
(i) If FD is (2h, T )-smooth for every D ∈ Xn, there
exists k = k(S(F ), ε, β, `, h, T ) such that α =
O
(
S(F )
ε log(1/β)
) h
`+h
;
(ii) If FD is (γ, L)-Ho¨lder continuous for every D ∈ Xn,
there exists k = k(S(F ), ε, β, `, γ, L) such that α =
O
(
S(F )
ε log(1/β)
) γ
2`+γ
; and
(iii) If FD is linear for everyD ∈ Xn, there exists a constant
k such that α = O
(
S(F )
ε log(1/β)
)
.
Moreover, if 1/S(F ) ≤ poly(n), then the running-time of
the mechanism and the running-time per evaluation are both
polynomial in n and 1/ε.
4.1 Proof of the Main Theorem2
To prove privacy we note that only the coefficients of the
Bernstein polynomial of FD are sensitive and need to be
protected. In order to provide ε-differential privacy, these
coefficients—evaluations of target FD on a cover—are per-
turbed by means of Lemma 1. In this way, we can release the
sanitized coefficients and use them for unlimited, efficient
evaluation of the approximation of FD over Y , without fur-
ther access to the data D. To establish utility, we separately
analyze error due to the polynomial approximation of FD
and error due to perturbation.
In order to analyze the accuracy of our mechanism, we
denote by B˜(h)k (FD;y) the iterated Bernstein polynomial
of order h constructed using the coefficients output by the
mechanismM. The error α introduced by the mechanism
can be expressed as follows:
α = max
y∈[0,1]`
∣∣∣∣FD(y)− B˜(h)k (FD;y)∣∣∣∣ (1)
≤ max
y∈[0,1]`
∣∣∣∣B˜(h)k (FD;y)−B(h)k (FD;y)∣∣∣∣ (2)
+ max
y∈[0,1]`
∣∣∣FD(y)−B(h)k (FD;y)∣∣∣ .
2For sake of clarity, in Appendix B we provide a self-contained
proof of Theorem 3 for ` = 1. Although it is not a prerequisite to
the general result, it reflects the building blocks used in this section.
For every y ∈ [0, 1]`, the first summand in Equation (2)
consists of the absolute value of an affine combination of
independent Laplace-distributed random variables.
Proposition 4. Let Γ = {ν ∈ N` | 0 ≤ νj ≤ k for 1 ≤
j ≤ `}. For every ν = (ν1, . . . , ν`) ∈ Γ let Zν i.i.d.∼ Lap(λ).
Moreover, let τ ≥ 0 and constant Ch,` depend only on h, `.
Then:
P
 max
y∈[0,1]`
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑`
j=1
k∑
νj=0
Zν
∏`
i=1
b
(h)
νi,k
(yi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ
 ≤ e−τ/(Ch,`λ).
The proof of Proposition 4 follows from a result
of Proschan (1965) on the concentration of convex combi-
nations of random variables drawn i.i.d. from a log-concave
symmetric distribution. For completeness, we give the full
proof in Appendix D. Proposition 4 implies that with prob-
ability at least 1 − β the first summand in Equation (2) is
bounded by O
(
S(F )k` log(1/β)/ε
)
. In order to bound the
second summand we make use of the following (unidimen-
sional) convergence rates.
Theorem 5 (Micchelli 1973). Let h be a positive inte-
ger and T > 0. If f : [0, 1] → R is a (2h, T )-smooth
function, then, for all positive integers k and y ∈ [0, 1],∣∣∣f(y)−B(h)k (f ; y)∣∣∣ ≤ TDhk−h, where Dh is a constant
independent of k, f and y ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 6 (Kac 1938; Mathe´ 1999). Let 0 < γ ≤ 1 and
L > 0. If f : [0, 1]→ R is a (γ, L)-Ho¨lder continuous func-
tion, then
∣∣∣f(y)−B(1)k (f ; y)∣∣∣ ≤ L (4k)−γ/2 for all positive
integers k and y ∈ [0, 1].
By induction, it is possible to show that the approximation
error of the multivariate iterated Bernstein polynomial can
be bounded by O(`g(k)) = O(g(k)), if the error of the
corresponding univariate polynomial is bounded by g(k). For
completeness, we provide a proof in Appendix E.
All in all, the error α introduced by the mechanism can
thus be bounded by
α = O
(
g(k) +
S(F )k`
ε
log(1/β)
)
. (3)
Since g(k) is a decreasing function in k and the second
summand in Equation (3) is an increasing function in k, the
optimal value for k (up to a constant factor) is achieved when
k satisfies
g(k) =
S(F )k`
ε
log(1/β) . (4)
Solving Equation (4) with the bound for g(k) provided in
Theorem 5 yields
k = max
{
1,
(
ε
S(F ) log(1/β)
) 1
h+`
}
and substituting the thus obtained value of k into Equation (3)
yields the first statement of Theorem 3. Similarly, using the
bound for g(k) provided in Theorem 6 we get the result for
Ho¨lder continuous functions. The bound for linear functions
follows from the fact that the approximation error is zero for
h = 1 and k = 1, since linear functions are fixed points of
B
(1)
1 . Finally, the analysis of the running time follows from
observing that, for the optimal cover size k we computed, k`
is always upper bounded by ε/(S(F ) log(1/β)) and thus by
poly(n).
4.2 Discussion
Comparison to Baseline. Algorithm 1 is based on a rela-
tively simple approach: it evaluates the target function on a
lattice cover, adding Laplace noise for privacy. One might
be tempted to approximate the input function by rounding
a query point y to the nearest lattice point p and releasing
the corresponding noisy evaluation F˜D(p). Although it is
straightforward to prove that, for (γ, L)-Ho¨lder continuous
functions, such a piecewise constant approximation achieves
error O(1/kγ), this upper bound is essentially tight, as it can
be shown by considering the approximation error it achieves
for linear functions. Therefore, this method has two main
disadvantages: the output function is not even continuous (al-
though we always consider continuous input functions) and
for highly smooth input functions it cannot achieve the fast
convergence rates of the Bernstein mechanism. In Section 6,
we offer further examples supporting this argument.
(ε, δ)-Differential Privacy. We note that our analysis can
be easily extended to the relaxed notion of approximate differ-
ential privacy using advanced composition theorems (see for
example Dwork and Roth 2014) instead of sequential compo-
sition (Dwork et al. 2006). Specifically, it suffices to choose
the perturbation scale λδ = 2S(F )
√
2(k + 1)` log(1/δ)/ε.
Theorem 7. Let 0 < δ < 1. Under the same assumptions of
Theorem 3, the Bernstein mechanismM (with perturbation
scale λδ) provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy and is (α, β)-
accurate with error scaling as follows.
(i) If FD is (2h, T )-smooth for every D ∈ Xn, there
exists k = k(S(F ), ε, δ, β, `, h, T ) such that α =
O
(
S(F )
ε log(1/β)
√
log(1/δ)
) 2h
`+2h
; and
(ii) If FD is (γ, L)-Ho¨lder continuous for every D ∈ Xn,
there exists k = k(S(F ), ε, δ, β, `, γ, L) such that α =
O
(
S(F )
ε log(1/β)
√
log(1/δ)
) γ
`+γ
.
Even though this relaxation allows for improved accuracy,
in this work we explore a different point on the privacy-utility
Pareto front and focus our attention on ε-differential privacy,
since there is generally a significant motivation for achieving
stronger privacy guarantees. Moreover, to the best of our
knowledge, it is unknown whether previous solutions (Hall,
Rinaldo, and Wasserman 2013) even apply to this framework.
5 Lower Bound
In this section we present a lower bound on the error that any
ε-differentially private mechanism approximating a function
F : Xn × Y → R must introduce.
Theorem 8. For ε > 0, there exists a function F : Xn ×
Y → R such that the error that any ε-differentially private
mechanism approximating F introduces is Ω (S(F )/ε), with
probability arbitrarily close to 1.
Proof. In order to prove Theorem 8, we consider X ⊂ [0, 1]`
to be a finite set and without loss of generality we view the
database D as an element of Xn or as an element of N|X |,
i.e., a histogram over the elements of X , interchangeably. We
can then make use of a general result provided by De (2012).
Proposition 9 (De 2012). Assume D1,D2, . . . ,D2s ∈ NN
such that, for every i, ‖Di‖1 ≤ n and, for i 6= j, ‖Di −
Dj‖1 ≤ ∆. Moreover, let f : NN → Rt be such that for any
i 6= j, ‖f(Di)− f(Dj)‖∞ ≥ η. If ∆ ≤ (s− 1)/ε, then any
mechanism which is ε-differentially private for the query f
on databases of size n introduces an error which is Ω(η),
with probability arbitrarily close to 1.
Therefore, we only need to show that there exists a suit-
able sequence of databases D1,D2, . . . ,D2s , a function
F : Xn × Y → R and a y ∈ Y such that F (·,y) satisfies
the assumptions of Proposition 9. We actually show that this
holds for every y ∈ Y . Let ε > 0 and V be a non-negative
integer. We define X = ({0, 1/(V +8), 2/(V +8), . . . , 1})`.
Note that N = |X | = (V + 9)`. Let furthermore c = b1/εc
and n = V + c. The function F : Xn × [0, 1]` → R we
consider is defined as follows:
F (D,y) = η(d0+. . .+dN−7+2dN−6+. . .+8dN+〈y,1〉),
where di corresponds to the number of entries in D whose
value is xi, for every xi ∈ X . For s = 3, we consider
the sequence of databases D1,D2, . . . ,D8, where, for j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 8}, di ∈ Dj is such that
di =

1, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , V − 1}
c, for i = N − j + 8
0, otherwise
.
We first observe that, for every j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}, ‖Dj‖1 = n.
Moreover, for i 6= j, ‖Di − Dj‖1 = 2c ≤ 2/ε. Finally, for
i 6= j, |F (Di,y) − F (Dj ,y)| ≥ cη for every y ∈ [0, 1]`.
Since S(F ) = 7η, Proposition 9 implies that, with high prob-
ability, any ε-differentially private mechanism approximating
F must introduce an error of order Ω (S(F )/ε).
6 Examples
In this section, we demonstrate the versatility of the Bern-
stein mechanism through the analysis of a range of example
learners.
Kernel Density Estimation. Let X = Y = [0, 1]` and
D = (d1,d2, . . . ,dn) ∈ Xn. For a given kernel KH , with
bandwidthH (a symmetric and positive definite `×`matrix),
the kernel density estimator FH : Xn × Y → R is defined
as FH(D,y) = 1n
∑n
i=1KH(y − di). It is easy to see that
S(FH) ≤ supy∈[−1,1]` KH(y)/n. For instance, ifKH is the
Gaussian kernel with covariance matrix H , then S(FH) ≤
1/(n
√
(2pi)` det(H)). Moreover, observe that FH(D, ·) is
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Figure 1: Private KDE with Gaussian kernel
an (h, T )-smooth function for any positive integer h. Hence
the error introduced by the mechanism is
O
(
1
nε
√
det(H)
log(1/β)
) h
`+h
,
with probability at least 1−β. In Figure 1 we display the util-
ity (averaged over 1000 repeats) of the Bernstein mechanism
(k = 20) on 5000 points drawn from a mixture of two normal
distributions N(0.5, 0.02) and N(0.75, 0.005) with weights
0.4, 0.6, respectively. We first observe that for every privacy
budget ε there is a suitable choice of h such that our mecha-
nism always achieves better utility compared to the baseline
(cf. Section 4.2). Moreover, accuracy improves for increasing
h, except for sufficiently large perturbations (small ε) which
more significantly affect higher-order basis functions (larger
h). Private cross validation (Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and Sar-
wate 2011; Chaudhuri and Vinterbo 2013) can be used to
tune h. We conclude noting that the same error bounds can
be provided by the mechanism of Wang et al. (2013), since
the function FH(D, ·) is separable in the training set D, i.e.,
FH(D, ·) =
∑
d∈D fH(d, ·). However, this assumption is
overly restrictive for many applications. In the following, we
discuss how the Bernstein mechanism can be successfully
applied to several such cases.
Priestley-Chao Kernel Regression. For ease of exposi-
tion, consider ` = 1. For constant B > 0, let X = [0, 1] ×
[−B,B] and Y = [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, con-
sider datasets D = ((d1, l1), (d2, l2), . . . , (dn, ln)) ∈ Xn,
where d1 ≤ d2 ≤ . . . ≤ dn, and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
there exists j 6= i such that |di − dj | ≤ c/n, for a given
(and publicly known) 0 < c = o(n). Small values of c re-
strict the data space under consideration, whereas c = n
would correspond to the general case D ∈ Xn. For kernel
K and bandwidth b > 0, the Priestley-Chao kernel estima-
tor (Priestley and Chao 1972; Benedetti 1977) is defined
as Fb(D, y) = 1b
∑n
i=2(di − di−1)K ((y − di)/b) li. This
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Figure 2: Private SVM with Gaussian kernel
function is not separable in D and
S(Fb) = sup
y∈Y
S(Fb(·, y)) ≤ 4Bc
nb
sup
y∈[−1,1]
K
(y
b
)
.
If K is the Gaussian kernel, then with probability at least
1− β the error introduced by the mechanism can be bounded
by
O
( c
nεb
log(1/β)
) h
1+h
.
Naive Bayes Classification. In this example we apply the
Bernstein mechanism to a probabilistic learner. Without loss
of generality, assume X = [0, 1]`, X = X × {l+, l−}, Y =
X and D = ((d1, l1), (d2, l2), . . . , (dn, ln)) ∈ Xn. A naive
Bayes classifier can be interpreted as F : Xn × Y → R such
that FD(y) ∝ P(y|l+,D)P(l+|D) − P(y|l−,D)P(l−|D).
Predictions can then be made by assigning the instance y
to the class l+ (resp. l−) if FD(y) ≥ 0 (resp. FD(y) < 0).
Since, for a class l, P(y|l,D) ∝ ∏`i=1 P(yi|l,D), it is easy
to show that FD(·) is an (h, T )-smooth function whenever
each likelihood is estimated using a Gaussian distribution or
KDE (John and Langley 1995) (with a sufficiently smooth
kernel). In the latter case, using a Gaussian kernel, the sen-
sitivity of F can be bounded by S(F ) ≤ 2(1/n + (2` −
1)/(n
√
2pib)), where b is the chosen bandwidth. The detailed
computation is provided in Appendix F. The error introduced
by the Bernstein mechanism is thus bounded by
O
(
1
nεb
log(1/β)
) h
`+h
,
with probability at least 1− β.
Regularized Empirical Risk Minimization. In the next
examples, the functions we aim to release are implicitly
defined by an algorithm. Let X = [0, 1]`, X = X ×
[0, 1] and Y = X . Let L be a convex and locally M -
Lipschitz (in the first argument) loss function. For D =
((d1, l1), (d2, l2), . . . , (dn, ln)) ∈ Xn, a regularized empiri-
cal risk minimization program with loss function L is defined
as
w? ∈ arg min
w∈Rr
C
n
n∑
i=1
L(li, fw(di)) +
1
2
‖w‖22 , (5)
where fw(x) = 〈φ(x),w〉 for a chosen feature mapping
φ : X → Rr taking points from X to some (possibly in-
finite) r-dimensional feature space and a hyperplane nor-
mal w ∈ Rr. Let K(x,y) = 〈φ(x), φ(y)〉 be the ker-
nel function induced by the feature mapping φ. The Rep-
resenter Theorem (Kimeldorf and Wahba 1971) implies
that the minimizer w? lies in the span of the functions
K(·,di) ∈ H, where H is a reproducing kernel Hilbert
space (RKHS). Therefore, we consider F : Xn × Y → R
such that FD(y) = fw?(y) =
∑n
i=1 αiliK(y,di), for some
αi ∈ R. An upper bound on the sensitivity of this function
follows from an argument provided by Hall, Rinaldo, and
Wasserman (2013) based on a technique of Bousquet and
Elisseeff (2002). In particular, we have
S(F ) = sup
y∈Y,w∼w′
|fw(y)− fw′(y)| ≤ MC
n
sup
y∈Y
K(y,y).
IfK is (2h, T )-smooth, the error introduced is bounded, with
probability at least 1− β, by
O
(
MC supy∈Y K(y,y)
nε
log(1/β)
) h
`+h
,
Note that this result holds with very mild assumptions,
namely for any convex and locally M -Lipschitz loss func-
tion (e.g., square-loss, log-loss, hinge-loss) and any bounded
kernel K. Figure 2 depicts SVM learning with RBF kernel
(C = σ = 1) on 1500 each of positive (negative) Gaus-
sian data with mean [0.3, 0.5] ([0.6, 0.4]) and covariance
[0.01, 0; 0, 0.01] (0.01 ∗ [1, 0.8; 0.8, 1.5]) and demonstrates
the mechanism’s uniform approximation of predictions, best
seen geometrically with the classifier’s decision boundary.
Logistic Regression. Let now X = {x ∈ [0, 1]` : ‖x‖2 ≤
1}. Let furthermore X = X × [0, 1] and Y = [0, 1]`. The
logistic regressor can be seen as a function F : Xn×Y → R
such that FD(y) = 〈w?,y〉, where w? is the minimizer
of (5) when φ is the identity mapping and the loss function
is L(l, 〈w,d〉) = log (1 + e−l〈w,d〉). It is then possible to
show that the error introduced by the Bernstein mechanism
is bounded, with probability at least 1− β, by
O
(
C
nε
log(1/β)
)
,
since FD(y) is a linear function. The prediction with the
sigmoid function achieves the same error bound, since it
is 1/4-Lipschitz. A more detailed analysis is provided in
Appendix G.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the release of functions of
test data and privacy-sensitive training data. We have pre-
sented a simple yet effective mechanism for this general
setting, that makes use of iterated Bernstein polynomials to
approximate any regular function with perturbations applied
to the resulting coefficients. Both ε-differential privacy and
utility rates are proved in general for the mechanism, with
corresponding lower bounds provided. A number of example
learners are analyzed, demonstrating the Bernstein mecha-
nism’s versatility.
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A Fixed Points of the Bernstein Operator
Although this is a classical result, we show for completeness
that linear functions are fixed points of the Bernstein operator
Bk = B
(1)
k , for k ≥ 1. Let f(y) = my + q, for m, q ∈ R
and y ∈ [0, 1]. We have
Bk(f ; y) =
k∑
ν=0
f
(ν
k
)
bν,k(y)
=
m
k
k∑
ν=0
νbν,k(y) + q
k∑
ν=0
bν,k(y)
= my + q ,
since
∑k
ν=0 bν,k(y) = 1 and
∑k
ν=0 νbν,k(y) = ky.
B Proof of Theorem 3 for ` = 1
Let us fix k, a positive integer. As described in Algorithm 1,
the Bernstein mechanism perturbs the evaluation of the func-
tion FD on a cover of the interval [0, 1].
Lemma 10. Let ε > 0. Then the Bernstein mechanismM
provides ε-differential privacy.
Proof. Let D′ ∈ Xn be a second database differing from D
in one entry only. Let furthermore ψ : Xn → Rk+1 be the
map defined by
ψ(D) =
(
FD
(
0
k
)
, FD
(
1
k
)
, . . . , FD
(
k
k
))
.
Then
S(ψ) = sup
D∼D′
‖ψ(D)− ψ(D′)‖1
≤
k∑
ν=0
sup
D∼D′
∣∣∣FD (ν
k
)
− FD′
(ν
k
)∣∣∣
≤ S(F )(k + 1) .
According to Lemma 1 (applied with k+ 1 in place of d), the
mechanismM provides ε-differential privacy.
In order to analyze the accuracy of our mechanism, we
denote by B˜(h)k (FD; y) =
∑k
ν=0 [FD (ν/k) + Zν ] b
(h)
ν,k(y)
the iterated Bernstein polynomial of order h constructed
using the coefficients output by the mechanismM. The error
α introduced by the mechanism can be expressed as follows:
α = max
y∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣FD(y)− B˜(h)k (FD; y)∣∣∣∣ (6)
≤ max
y∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣B˜(h)k (FD; y)−B(h)k (FD; y)∣∣∣∣ (7)
+ max
y∈[0,1]
∣∣∣FD(y)−B(h)k (FD; y)∣∣∣ .
For every y ∈ [0, 1], the first summand in Equation (7)
consists of the absolute value of an affine combination of
independent Laplace-distributed random variables.
Proposition 11. Let Z0, . . . , Zk
i.i.d.∼ Lap(λ), τ ≥ 0, and
Ch be a constant depending on h only. Then:
P
[
max
y∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
ν=0
Zνb
(h)
ν,k(y)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ
]
≤ e−τ/(Chλ) .
We provide the proof of Proposition 11 in Appendix C.
Proposition 11 implies that with probability at least 1 −
β the first summand in Equation (7) is bounded by
O (S(F )k log(1/β)/ε). According to the regularity of FD,
the second summand in Equation (7) can then be bounded by
a decreasing function g(k). All in all, the error in Equation (6)
can be bounded as follows:
α = O
(
g(k) +
S(F )k
ε
log(1/β)
)
. (8)
Since the second summand in Equation (8) is an increasing
function in k, the optimal value for k (up to a constant factor)
is achieved when k satisfies
g(k) =
S(F )k
ε
log(1/β) . (9)
Solving Equation (9) with the bounds for g(k) provided in
Theorems 5 and 6 and substituting the thus obtained value
of k into (8) prove the first two statements. The bound when
FD is linear follows from the fact that for h = 1 and k = 1
the approximation error in Equation (7) is zero. The error is
thus bounded by O (S(F ) log(1/β)/ε). The running time of
the mechanism and the running time for answering a query
is linear in k and hence upper bounded by a polynomial in n
and 1/ε, if 1/S(F ) ≤ poly(n).
C Proof of Proposition 11
In order to prove the proposition, we make use of the follow-
ing result.
Theorem 12 (Proschan 1965). Suppose that f : R→ [0, 1]
is a log-concave density function such that f(y) = f(−y) for
every y ∈ R. Let Z1, . . . , Zm be i.i.d. random variables with
density f , and suppose that (a1, . . . , am), (b1, . . . , bm) ∈
[0, 1]m satisfy
(i) a1 ≥ a2 ≥ . . . ≥ am, b1 ≥ b2 ≥ . . . ≥ bm;
(ii)
∑k
i=1 bi ≤
∑k
i=1 ai for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1;
(iii)
∑m
i=1 ai =
∑m
i=1 bi = 1.
Then, for all τ ≥ 0
P
[∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
biZi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ
]
< P
[∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
aiZi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ
]
.
Choosing a1 = 1 and aj = 0 for j = 2, . . . ,m, Theorem 12
implies
P
[∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
biZi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ
]
< P [|Z1| ≥ τ ] (10)
for every (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ [0, 1]m which satisfies
∑m
i=1 bi =
1. We then observe that the density function h(y) =
exp(−|y|/λ)/(2λ) of the Laplace distribution is symmetric
and log-concave. If Zi ∼ Lap(λ) are i.i.d. random variables
for i = 1, . . . ,m, the right-hand side of Equation (10) satis-
fies
P [|Z1| ≥ τ ] = exp
(
− τ
λ
)
. (11)
Although the bases b(h)ν,k are not always positive for h ≥ 2,
we observe that, for y ∈ [0, 1], V (y) = ∑kν=0 Zνb(h)ν,k(y) and
V ′(y) =
∑k
ν=0 Zν |b(h)ν,k(y)| have the same distribution, since
the random variables Zν are i.i.d. and symmetric around zero.
We can thus restrict our analysis to V ′(y). For y ∈ [0, 1], let
U(y) =
∑k
ν=0 |b(h)ν,k(y)|. We first note that
U(y) =
k∑
ν=0
∣∣∣∣∣
h∑
i=1
(
h
i
)
(−1)i−1Bi−1k (bν,k; y)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
k∑
ν=0
h∑
i=1
(
h
i
) ∣∣Bi−1k (bν,k; y)∣∣
=
k∑
ν=0
h∑
i=1
(
h
i
)
Bi−1k (bν,k; y)
=
h∑
i=1
(
h
i
) k∑
ν=0
Bi−1k (bν,k; y)
=
h∑
i=1
(
h
i
)
Bi−1k
(
k∑
ν=0
bν,k; y
)
=
h∑
i=1
(
h
i
)
= 2h − 1 . (12)
According to Equations (10) and (11), for every y ∈ [0, 1]
and τ ′ ≥ 0 we have
P
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1U(y)
k∑
ν=0
Zν |b(h)ν,k(y)|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ ′
]
≤ exp
(
−τ
′
λ
)
.
Choosing τ = U(y)τ ′, we get
P
[∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
ν=0
Zν |b(h)ν,k(y)|
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ τ
]
≤ exp
(
− τ
U(y)λ
)
≤ exp
(
− τ
(2h − 1)λ
)
,
for every y ∈ [0, 1], concluding the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of the proposition follows from the same argu-
ment provided in Appendix C, with some minor changes. In
particular, it suffices to provide a tail bound for
max
y∈[0,1]`
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑`
j=1
k∑
νj=0
Zν
∣∣∣∣∣∏`
i=1
b
(h)
νi,k
(yi)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
since, as observed in Appendix C, the random variables Zν
are i.i.d. and symmetric around zero. In order to apply Theo-
rem 12 and conclude the proof, we need to upper bound
U(y) =
∑`
j=1
k∑
νj=0
∣∣∣∣∣∏`
i=1
b
(h)
νi,k
(yi)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
for every y ∈ [0, 1]`. We have
U(y) =
∑`
j=1
k∑
νj=0
∏`
i=1
∣∣∣b(h)νi,k(yi)∣∣∣
=
∑`
j=2
k∑
νj=0
∏`
i=2
∣∣∣b(h)νi,k(yi)∣∣∣
 k∑
ν1=0
∣∣∣b(h)ν1,k(y1)∣∣∣
≤ (2h − 1)` ,
since, according to Equation (12),
k∑
νj=0
∣∣∣b(h)νj ,k(yj)∣∣∣ ≤ (2h − 1)
for every j ∈ {1, . . . , `}. The rest of the proof follows from
the same computations done at the end of Appendix C.
E Approximation Error of Multivariate
Bernstein Polynomials
In what follows, we assume that f : [0, 1]` → R is a (γ, L)-
Ho¨lder continuous function. The proof for (h, T )-smooth
functions follows the same argument, with minor changes.
The argument we present here is by induction on `. The
base case (` = 1) follows from the fact that the Bernstein
polynomialBk(f ; y1) converge uniformly to f in the interval
[0, 1], as shown in Theorem 6. Assume now
|Bk(f ;y)− f(y)| ≤ `L
(
1
4k
)γ/2
,
for every y ∈ [0, 1]`. Let f : [0, 1]`+1 → R be a
(γ, L)-Ho¨lder continuous function and let Bk(f ;y) be
the corresponding Bernstein polynomial. For every y =
(y1, . . . , y`+1) ∈ [0, 1]`+1, let
G(f ;y) =
∑`
j=1
k∑
νj=0
f
(ν1
k
, · · · , ν`
k
, y`+1
)∏`
i=1
b
(h)
νi,k
(yi).
The error |Bk(f ;y)− f(y)| can then be bounded by
≤ |Bk(f ;y)−G(f ;y)|+ |G(f ;y)− f(y)| (13)
≤ L
(
1
4k
)γ/2
+ `L
(
1
4k
)γ/2
= (`+ 1)L
(
1
4k
)γ/2
.
In fact, the second term of Equation (13) is the error of the
Bernstein polynomial of f seen as a function of y1, . . . , y`
only. The corresponding bound then follows from the induc-
tive step. On the other hand, the first summand corresponds
to the approximation error of the (univariate) Bernstein poly-
nomial of G(f,y) as a function of the remaining variable
y`+1. The statement for (h, T )-smooth functions is similarly
obtained by replacing Bk with B
(h)
k and using the bound of
Theorem 5.
F Naive Bayes Classification
In this section, we show how to bound the sensitivity of a
naive Bayes classifier FD, as defined in Section 6.
S(F ) = sup
y∈[0,1]`,D∼D′
|F (D,y)− F (D′,y)|
≤ 2 sup
l∈{l+,l−},y∈[0,1]`,D∼D′
|P(y|l,D)P(l|D)
− P(y|l,D′)P(l|D′)| .
We assume that a class probability P(l|D) is estimated
using the corresponding relative frequency in the training
set D. Therefore, for D ∼ D′, P(l|D) ≤ P(l|D′) + 1/n.
Assume now that for every y ∈ [0, 1]`, D ∼ D′ ∈ Xn,
l ∈ {l+, l−} and i ∈ {1, . . . , `} there exists 0 ≤ ξ < 1 such
that
|P(yi|l,D)− P(yi|l,D′)| ≤ ξ
holds. We then have
P(y|l,D) ∝
∏`
i=1
P(yi|l,D)
≤
∏`
i=1
(P(yi|l,D′) + ξ)
≤
∏`
i=1
P(yi|l,D′) + (2` − 1)ξ ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that there
are 2` − 1 cross products and each one of them has at least
a ξ factor. If each (unidimensional) likelihood is estimated
using KDE (John and Langley 1995) with a Gaussian kernel
of bandwidth b, ξ corresponds to the upper bound on the
sensitivity of KDE shown in Section 6. Putting all the pieces
together, we obtain
S(F ) ≤ 2 sup
l∈{l+,l−},y∈[0,1]`,D∼D′
P(l|D′) 2
` − 1
n
√
2pib
+
1
n
P(y|l,D)
≤ 2
(
2` − 1
n
√
2pib
+
1
n
)
.
G Logistic Regression
Let X = {x ∈ [0, 1]` : ‖x‖2 ≤ 1}. Let furthermore
X = X × [0, 1] and Y = [0, 1]`. The logistic regressor
can be seen as a function F : Xn × Y → [0, 1] such that,
for D = ((d1, l1), (d2, l2), . . . , (dn, ln)) ∈ Xn, FD(y) =
1/(1 + exp(−〈w?,y〉)), where w? is such that
w? ∈ arg min
w∈R`
C
n
n∑
i=1
log
(
1 + e−li〈w,di〉
)
+
1
2
‖w‖22 .
In order to compute S(F ), we first observe that the sig-
moid function is 1/4-Lipschitz. Denoting by w ∼ w′ the
minimizers obtained from input databases D ∼ D′, we have
S(F ) ≤ sup
y∈Y,w∼w′
1
4
|〈w −w′,y〉|
≤ sup
y∈Y,w∼w′
1
4
‖w −w′‖2‖y‖2 ,
where the last inequality follows from an application
of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Chaudhuri and Mon-
teleoni (2008) showed supw∼w′ ‖w−w′‖2 ≤ 2C/n. Since
‖y‖2 ≤
√
` for every y ∈ Y , we have S(F ) ≤ C√`/(2n).
Since FD is an (h, T )-smooth function for any positive inte-
ger h, with probability at least 1− β the error introduced by
the mechanism is bounded by
O
(
C
nε
log(1/β)
) h
`+h
.
We note that defining FD(y) = 〈w?,y〉 the previous bound
can be improved to
O
(
C
nε
log(1/β)
)
,
since S(F ) ≤ 2C√`/n and FD(y) is a linear function. The
prediction with the sigmoid function achieves the same error
bound, being 1/4-Lipschitz.
